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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LEGISLATION IN
INDIANA: A QUEST FOR BALANCE
In recent years the number of medical malpractice suits has in-
creased dramatically.' This litigious trend has created major prob-
lems for the medical community in Indiana.2 Medical malpractice
1. For general comments on the subject, see Adler, Malicious Prosecution
Suits as a Counterbalance to Medical Malpractice Suits, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51 (1972);
Greenbaum, Physician Countersuits: A Cause Without Action, 12 PAC. L.J. 745 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Greenbaum]; Comment, Countersuits to Legal and Medical Mal-
practice Actions: Any Chance for Success?, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 93 (1981). Our society's
penchant for litigation is by no means limited to medical malpractice suits. See Hurley,
Much Ado About Nothing, 17 DOCKET CALL, no. 2, Summer 1982 12, 14. From 1940 to
1981, federal civil suits grew six times faster than the population. Some examples of
frivolous suits cited in the Hurley article are a lawsuit against Jimmy the Groundhog
for mistakenly forecasting an early spring; a suit filed against the Chicago Bears for
misrepresenting themselves as a professional football team; and a $10 million federal
class action suit brought against professional baseball on behalf of the fans allegedly
injured by the 1981 baseball strike. Reasons cited for the litigation explosion are
breakdowns in relationships and the proliferation of attorneys at too great a rate for
society to absorb. Attorney Hurley reminds his readers of the admonition of Abraham
Lincoln, "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you
can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses
and waste of time."; Bork, Dealing With the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D.
231 (1976), concluding that the United States is steadily transforming itself into a
welfare state and the proliferation in social policies and regulations somewhat explain
the 100% rise in federal court dockets from 1960 to 1975; Mallen, An Attorney's
Liability for Malicious Prosecution, A Misunderstood Tort, 46 INS. COUNS. J. 407 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Mallen]. One court has characterized America's penchant for
litigation as a national pastime. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1380, (N.D. Iowa),
aff'd 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978).
2. The severity of the malpractice problem in Indiana is discussed in Johnson
v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., __ Ind. , 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980). The court states:
Premiums had already increased as much as 1200 percent over a period of
fifteen years because of the increase in the number and size of claims.
Physicia~is practicing high risk specialties such as anesthesiology were
hard pressed or totally unable to purchase insurance coverage. In some
rural areas surgery was reported cancelled. Emergency services were
discontinued at some hospitals. Health care providers had become fearful
of the exposure to malpractice claims and at the same time were unable
to obtain adequate malpractice insurance coverage at reasonable prices.
Id. at 589-90.
Further elucidation of the situation in Indiana is provided by Brief for Appellee
at 5, Mansur v. Carpenter, __ Ind. __ , 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980), warning that the dif-
ficulty of obtaining adequate malpractice coverage was forcing physicians to retire at
early ages or leave the state. For examples of the malpractice problem in other states
and nationally, see U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Report of
Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW
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suits, once a rarity, have become commonplace and the amount of
damages awarded to successful plaintiffs have skyrocketed.' As a
result of the medical malpractice suit explosion, physicians have
been forced to pay exorbitant premiums for malpractice insurance.'
The cost of malpractice insurance is, to a large degree, passed on to
patients in the form of increased medical care costs.' Another unfor-
tunate effect of our society's litigious propensities in the medical
malpractice arena is the incidence of baseless malpractice claims filed
against health care providers.'
Report]; Note, Malicious Prosecution Liability of Plaintiff's Counsel for an Unwar-
ranted Medical Malpractice Suit-New Developments in Physician Countersuits for
Unfounded Medical Malpractice Claims, 7 N. Ky. L. REV. 265 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Malicious Prosecution Liability]; Reuter, Physicians Countersuits: A
Catch-22, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 203 [hereinafter cited as Reuter].
3. Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 3-4; Direct examination of William J.
Davey, Indiana Commissioner of Insurance, past examiner and chief examiner with In-
diana Department of Insurance: "The average settlement for the ten most costly cases
in Indiana for the period 1965-1966 was $10,435, for the period 1969-70 was $24,850, for
the period 1973-74 was $108,400 and for 1975, $213,000." See also HEW Report, supra
note 2, at 2-3. But see Gerry, Malpractice Insurance Premium Ripoff, 18 TRIAL 6 (June
1982), denying the existence of any medical malpractice crisis and stating that the
average verdict in the period 1975-79 decreased 40% from the average verdict in the
period 1970-74 in Cook County, Illinois.
4. See supra note 2.
5. Fifty cents ($ .50) of the daily hospital costs to patients was for the
hospital's malpractice insurance at the time of the HEW study. HEW Report, supra
note 2, at 13; Ind. House Journal, 99th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. at 578 (1975) (con-
cluding "increased insurance costs are being passed on to the patients in the form of
higher charges for health care services and facilities.")
6. Mallen, supra note 1, at 407; Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Lia-
bility of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1003 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum]; HEW Report, supra note 2, at 10;
the concern over spurious suits has caused an organization called "Lawyers Protecting
People from Malicious and Unjustified Lawsuits, Inc." to be created; Reuter, supra
note 2, n.6; Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical
Malpractice Claims?, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 653 (1976). The term "health care pro-
vider" as used in this note is defined in IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-1(a) (Burns Supp.
1982) as follows:
(a) 'Health Care provider' means:
(1) A person, partnership, corporation, professional corporation,
facility or institution licensed or legally authorized by this state to pro-
vide health care or professional services as a physician, psychiatric
hospital, hospital, dentist, registered or licensed practice nurse, op-
tometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist or psychologist, or
an officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his
employment;
(2) Any college, university or junior college which provides health
care to any student, faculty member, or employee, and the governing
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Opinions vary as to the exact frequency of meritless suits.7
However, at least one study has concluded that the vast majority of
medical malpractice suits are without legal merit.' A profound dif-
ference exists between a malpractice action brought despite an im-
probability of success and a frivolous or meritless suit. Medical
malpractice suits often involve complex and technical fact situations
in which even the most diligent attorney would be unable to conclu-
sively assign fault. Conversely, a frivolous suit is one brought by an
attorney who knows or should know that the defendant physician
was incapable of causing the injury to his client.9 It is only the lat-
ter that result in injustice and need to be discouraged. Injured pa-
tients should be afforded open access to courts for vindication of
even uncertain medical malpractice claims, however, basic notions of
fairness mandate that health care providers be protected against ut-
terly baseless and vexatious lawsuits.
Indiana's state legislature, with the help of a physician gover-
nor, ' responded to the malpractice suit explosion by passing a com-
board, or any officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course and
scope of his employment;
(3) A blood bank, community -mental health center, community
mental retardation center, or community mental health clinic; or
(4) A home health agency, as defined under IC 16-10-2.5-1.
7. Birnbaum, supra note 6, at 105-06; Reuter, supra note 2, at 204; HEW
Report, supra note 2, at 10 citing an insurance study that concluded 54 percent of
claims filed were not legally meritorious.
8. Brooke, Medical Malpractice: A Socio-Economic Problem from a Doctors
View, 6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 225, 229 (1970), cited a Pima County, Arizona Report that
concluded 87 percent of claims filed over a twelve (12) year period were without merit.
9. The word "frivolous" is inherently ambiguous. As is aptly pointed out by
San Francisco attorney Ronald Mallen: "Frivolity is in the eye of the beholder. One
person's frivolity is another person's ingenuity." Quoted in Hurley, supra note 1, at 15.
Attorney Mallen is the author of An Attorney's Liability for Malicious Prosecution,
supra note 1, and MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (1981).
In some circles "frivolous suit" has a much broader definition than the one given
above. Lyn Buzzard of the Christian Legal Society defines a frivolous suit as "one in
which litigation is simply not appropriate." Hurley, supra note 1, at 17. A district court
sitting in Colorado defined frivolous as "of little weight or importance having no basis
in law or fact," Morton v. Allied Stores Corp., 90 F.R.D. 352, 357 (D. Colo. 1981); or "a
frivolous action is one in which the plaintiff's realistic chances of success are slight."
Sims v. Zolango, 481 F. Supp. 388, 391 (D.N.Y. 1979), citing Clark v. Zimmerman, 394
F. Supp. 1166, 1178 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
10. The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act was enacted when Governor Otis
Bowen was in office. Governor Bowen graduated from the Indiana University School of
Medicine and prior to being elected governor maintained a general medical practice in
Bremen, Indiana. How a Country Doctor is Solving Indiana's Malpractice Crisis, 8
LEGAL Asp. MED. PRAC. 48 (May 1980).
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prehensive medical malpractice act." This act is designed to protect
the interests of the health care industry by such provisions as a
$500,000 limit on liability for health care providers, 2 a shortened
statute of limitations for minors,18 and the establishment of a manda-
tory medical review panel to which all malpractice claims must be
submitted prior to bringing any action in court." The specific impe-
tus for Indiana's act was the increasing high cost and unavailability
of medical malpractice insurance which accompanied the un-
precedented increase in medical malpractice suits.15
11. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to 10-5 (Burns Supp. 1982).
12. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-1 (Burns Supp. 1982).
13. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-3-1 to 3-2 (Burns Supp. 1982).
14. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to 9-10 (Burns Supp. 1982).
15. See supra note 2. The following is part of the legislative history behind
the Act contained in Indiana House Journal 99th General Assembly, 1st Sess. 1975 at
578:
SECTION 1. The general assembly finds that:
(a) The number of suits and claims for damages arising from pro-
fessional patient care has increased tremendously in the past several
years and the size of judgments and settlements in connection therewith
have increased unreasonably.
(b) The effect of such judgments and settlements, based frequently
on now legal precedents, have caused the insurance coverage to uniformly
and substantially increase the cost of such insurance coverage.
(c) These increased insurance costs are being passed on to the pa-
tients in the form of higher charges for health care services and facilities.
(d) The increased costs of providing health care services, the in-
creased incidents of claims and suits against health care provider [sic],
and the unusual size of such claims and judgments, frequently out of pro-
portion to the actual damage sustained, has caused many liability in-
surance companies to withdraw from the insuring of high risk health care
providers.
(e) The rising number of suits and claims is forcing health care
providers to practice defensively, viewing each patient as a potential
adversary in a lawsuit, to the detriment of both the health care provider
and the patient. Health care providers, for their own protection, are often
required to employ excessive diagnostic procedures for their patients, un-
necessarily increasing the cost of patient care.
(f) Another effect of the increase of suits and claims and the costs
thereof is that some health care providers decline to provide certain
health care services which in themselves entail some risk of patient in-
jury.
(g) The cost and difficulty in obtaining insurance for health care
providers discourages young physicians from entering into the practice of
medicine in the state of Indiana, resulting in the loss of physicians to
other states.
(h) the inability to obtain or the high cost of obtaining insurance
affects the medical and hospital services available in the state of Indiana
to the detriment of its citizens.
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Other states experiencing malpractice crises have attempted
similar legislation only to see their acts fail to survive constitutional
scrutiny."6 Indiana's act has withstood a number of multi-faceted con-
stitutional attacks. 7 However, successful malpractice legislation
does not solve all the problems occasioned by the increases in
malpractice litigation.
(i) Some health care providers have been forced to curtail the
practice of all or a part of their profession because of the non-availability
or high cost of liability insurance.
(j) The cumulative effect of suits and claims is working both to the
detriment of the health care providers and to the citizens of this state.
SECTION 2. Because of the conditions stated in SECTION 1, it is the
purpose of this act to establish a system by which a person who has sus-
tained bodily injury or death, as a result of tort or breach of contract on
the part of a health care provider resulting from professional services
rendered, or which should have been rendered, can obtain prompt deter-
mination and adjudication of his claim and fair and reasonable compensa-
tion at a fair and reasonable cost, from financially responsible health care
providers who are able to insure their potential liability at reasonably af-
fordable rates.
16. The following cases have struck down major portions of state malpractice
legislation: Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass'n, 63 11. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976) (abolished a $500,000 limitation on recovery and mandatory medical review
panels as violative of ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (equal protection); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13
(right to trial by jury); ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 9 (guaranty of exclusive and entire
judicial power in courts); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for
Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (invalidated a mandatory medical
review board provision as violative of MO. CONST. art. I, § 14 (open access to courts
guaranty)); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (invalidated a $250,000 limita-
tion on liability and a two-year statute of limitations as violative of U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV (equal protection); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) (repealed North
Dakota's Malpractice Act in toto as violative of U.S. CONST. amend XIV (equal protec-
tion and due process); and a number of state constitutional provisions.); Simon v. St.
Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio App. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976) (struck down com-
pulsory arbitration requirements as violative of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (equal protec-
tion) and OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5 (right to trial by jury); Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d
190 (Pa. 1978) (abolished a mandatory review panel system as violative of PA. CONST.
art. I, § 6 (right to trial by jury).
17. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., supra note 2. (The Act was attacked as
violative of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (equal protection and due process); IND. CONST.
art. I, § 20 (right to trial by jury); IND. CONST. art. I, § 12 (open access to courts
guaranty); IND. CONST. art. I, § 23 (equal privileges clause); IND. CONST. art. I, § 9 (right
to free thought, speech and writing); IND. CONST. art. III, § 1 (separation of powers);
IND. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (prohibition of special legislation)); Hines v. Elkhart Gen.
Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (D. Ind.), aff'd, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979) (attacked as
violative of U.S. CONST. amend. VII (right to trial by jury); U.S. CONST. amend. 14
(equal protection); IND. CONST. art. 1, § 20 (right to trial by jury); IND. CONST. art. I, § 23
(equal privileges guaranty); IND. CONST. art. I, § 12 (access to courts guaranty); Car-
michael v. Silbert, - Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1330 (1980) (attacked as violative of
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Another response to the malpractice suit explosion has been a
surge in countersuits by physicians against former patients or their
attorneys. 8 The countersuits are brought by health care providers
after they have been successful in defending baseless malpractice ac-
tions. In theory, countersuits provide physicians with a means to
recover money damages for the injuries caused by public accusa-
tions of professional negligence. 9 Countersuits generally proceed as
tort actions for malicious prosecution." However, in most jurisdic-
tions, including Indiana, such suits have been an ineffective retalia-
tory weapon for injured physicians.21
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (equal protection)); IND. CONST. art. I, § 23 (equal privileges
guaranty); Kravda v. Houser-Norborg Medical Corp., - Ind. App. - , 419 N.E.2d
1024 (1981) (court simply cited Johnson, supra as binding authority since the same con-
stitutional claims were brought); Whitaker v. St. Joseph's Hospt., - Ind. App. ,
415 N.E.2d 737 (1981) (attacked as violative of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (equal protec-
tion)); IND. CONST. art. I, § 12 (open access to courts guaranty); IND. CONST. art. VII, § 1
(improper delegation of judicial power); Lee v. Lafayette Home Hosp., Inc., __ Ind.
App. , 410 N.E.2d 1319 (1980) (court held that since all constitutional issues in the
instant case had already been decided in Johnson, supra they were moot).
18. See, e.g., Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979); Rodriguez v. Car-
roll, 510 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Bickle v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa
1978); Weaver v. Superior Court, County of Orange, 95 Cal. App. 3d 189, 156 Cal. Rptr.
745 (1979); Lackner v. LaCroix, 88 Cal. App. 3d 948, 152 Cal Rptr. 221 (1979); Ammer-
man v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. App. 1978); Fee, Parker & Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379
So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Il. App. 3d 824, 382
N.E.2d 1257 (1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); Lyd-
don v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902
(Iowa 1978); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So.
2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981);
Ackerman v. Lagano, 412 A.2d 1054 (N.J. 1979); Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 260
S.E.2d 130 (1979); Dakters v. Shane, 64 Ohio App. 2d 196, 412 N.E.2d 399 (1978);
O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Jacques v. McLaughlin, 401 A.2d
430 (R.I. 1979); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Krieg v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp., 104 Wisc. 2d 455, 311 N.W.2d (1981).
19. However, in practice physicians have rarely been successful in counter-
suits. Only three verdicts for physicians against attorneys have been upheld at ap-
pellate levels: Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981) (a $37,500 verdict against an
attorney was upheld); Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980) (allowed a
$85,000 award against an attorney on an abuse of process theory); Peerman v.
Sidicane, 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (affirmed a $11,500 jury award to a
physician).
20. In one study of thirty-four (34) physician-attorney countersuits, only three
did not use a theory of malicious prosecution. Greenbaum, supra note 1, at 746. Some
courts have held that malicious prosecution is a physician's sole remedy in a counter-
suit against an attorney. Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978);
Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Ill. App. 3d 824, 382 N.E.2d 1257 (1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56
Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); see also infra note 76 (discussing different
theories advanced).
21. See supra note 19.
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Since the onset of the malpractice crisis attorneys, courts, and
lawmakers have struggled to equitably balance the interests of pa-
tients attempting to assert valid claims and doctors trying to pursue
their profession.22 Three noticeable attempts to find this balance
have been medical malpractice legislation, the increase in physician's
countersuits, and malicious prosecution counterclaims. This note
reviews the effectiveness of the various attempts looking first to
several controversial provisions of the Indiana Medical Malpractice
Act. 3 All constitutional challenges to the provisions of the act, both
state and federal, have been unsuccessful,24 indicating that the
judiciary recognizes the enormity of the malpractice problem in In-
diana and the need to moderate the crisis despite the debilitating ef-
fects on patients' rights.25
Next, the standard that attorneys must meet when deciding to
bring suit in Indiana in order to avoid malicious prosecution liability
is examined. This standard was recently developed in Wong v.
Tabor,2" the first physician/attorney countersuit to reach the ap-
pellate level in Indiana. The standard does not effectively protect
the rights of physicians and needs to be revised. Finally, this note
explores the possibility of using malicious prosecution counterclaims
as a means for striking the elusive balance of interests between
physicians and patients. 7
MALPRACTICE LEGISLATION IN INDIANA
Indiana responded to the medical malpractice crisis by passing
a comprehensive Medical Malpractice Act in 1975.28 Several constitu-
tionally approved provisions of the Act endow health care providers
with procedural safeguards that substantially tip the balance of in-
terests in their favor.' Constitutional approval of the Act under-
lines the recognition by both the Indiana legislature and the
22. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); O'Toole v.
Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); see also Birnbaum, supra note 6, at 1014.
23. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to 10-5 (Burns Supp. 1982).
24. See supra note 17.
25. See generally Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., __ Ind. __, 404
N.E.2d 585 (1980).
26. __ Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1279 (1981).
27. Malicious prosecution counterclaims have been urged by the American
Medical Association and have been adopted by the state legislatures in Washington
and Tennessee. See infra text and accompanying notes 157-82.
28. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to 10-5 (Burns Supp. 1982).
29. See Note, The Indiana Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patients'
Rights, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 304 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Legislative Surgery].
Sections not discussed in this note but ostensibly favoring physicians' rights over pa-
1983]
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judiciary of the need to protect physicians from spurious attacks."
Specific provisions safeguarding health care providers include an ab-
solute $500,000 limit on recovery in any malpractice action,31 a short-
ened statute of limitations as applied to minors," and the use of a
mandatory medical review panel of which the voting members are
all health care providers.33 The legislative undermining of patients'
rights in favor of those of health care providers is manifest in the ir-
rebutable presumption that injuries experienced by patients, no
matter how grievous, cannot exceed $500,000. 3"
Limitation on Liability
The $500,000 limitation of recovery has withstood a number of
constitutional attacks. 5 The Indiana Supreme Court noted that
neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class was involved 6 and
applied a fair and substantial relationship standard of constitutional
review." In concluding that the state interest in the promotion of
tients are: IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1982) (limiting contingency fee
awards to 15%) and IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-6 (Burns Supp. 1982) (prohibiting re-
quests of dollar amounts of damages in malpractice complaints).
30. It is safe to say that the executive branch of Indiana's government also
recognized the need to protect physicians. Indiana's governor at the time of passage of
the Act was Otis Bowen, M.D. See supra note 10.
31. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1982).
32. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns Supp. 1982).
33. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-1 to 9-10 (Burns Supp. 1982).
34. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., __ Ind. __, 404 N.E.2d 585, 600
(1980), which upheld the validity of the $500,000 limitation of liability, contains
language indicating that the limitation of liability is not a presumption preventing
recovery of more than $500,000, but a policy of the law. Since regardless of the words
used to rationalize the limitation, the end result is that patients are limited to a
$500,000 recovery whatever the actual extent of their injuries, the difference between
"presumption" and "policy" appears to be one of semantics.
35. See supra note 17.
36. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., __ Ind. -, 404 N.E.2d 585, 597
(1980). Fundamental rights are those which have their origins in the express terms of
the Constitution or which are necessarily to be implied from those terms. Sidle v. Ma-
jors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763, 769 (1976).
Suspect class is one in which classifications are based upon a trait which itself
seems to contravene established constitutional principles so that the use of the
classification is suspect (e.g., race, national origin.) J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 525 (1978) [hereinafter YOUNG CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; see also San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (a suspect class is
one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful un-
equal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process").
37. The exact standard applied by the court required the Act's provisions "be
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health care services was substantially furthered by a $500,000
recovery limitation, the court has bestowed a special benefit38 on
health care providers while imposing a unique burden on severely
injured patients whose future medical bills and lifetime sustenance
costs will exceed the artificial limitation. 9 These unfortunate victims
of medical malpractice, although denied full compensation for their
injuries, will at least be afforded a substantial monetary recovery.
Some injured patients, however, because of the change in the
statute of limitations, may find their causes of action extinguished
before any injury is discovered.
Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations provided by the Medical Malpractice
Act severely curtails the rights of injured patients to file malprac-
tice actions." The new limitation is especially harsh when applied to
minors. Under the provisions of the Act, minors below the age of six
have until their eighth birthday to bring a malpractice suit,41 whereas
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 597 (1980), quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412 (1920).
Had the interest at stake been deemed fundamental rights or the persons
adversely affected a suspect class, the court would have applied a stricter test in
determining the constitutionality of the provisions. See YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
"supra note 36, at 522-57; Harper, Which Equal Protection Standard for Medical
Malpractice Legislation?, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 125 (1980).
38. No other professionals such as attorneys, accountants, etc., are protected
by legislation limiting their malpractice liability.
39. In upholding the limitation, the court in Johnson v. St. Vincent, Inc., __
Ind. -, 404 N.E.2d 585, 600 (1980), analogized to Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), in which the Supreme Court upheld a state statute providing for a maximum
AFDC disbursement to families based on family size. The impact of the statute was to
deny families with more than six (6) members minimum subsistence level support. The
Johnson court decided that the interest of severely injured patients in receiving full
compensation was great, but not any greater than that of children being denied sub-
sistence level support. Id. at 600. The flaw in this reasoning is that it is difficult to
imagine any interest that is greater than providing children, innocently born into a
large, poor family, with survival levels of support.
40. See Note, Legislative Surgery, supra note 29, at 338-50.
41. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns Supp. 1982) is as follows:
No claim, whether in contract or tort, may be brought against a health
care provider based upon professional services or health care rendered or
which should have been rendered unless filed within two (2) years from
the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect except that a minor under
the full age of six (6) years shall have until his eighth birthday in which to
file. This section applies to all persons regardless of minority or other
legal disability.
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minors above six must bring their malpractice claims within two
years of the date of the alleged act of malpractice.42 Prior to the
passage of the act, all minors were given until their twentieth birth-
day to bring suits.43 Hence, physicians or their insurers were subject
to paying malpractice claims resulting from incidents occurring up
to twenty years earlier. The long time period between the date of
the accident and the resulting liability made it difficult for insurance
companies to accurately predict their losses so as to establish
premium rates.44 By enacting this provision the legislature and,
through subsequent constitutional approval,45 the courts evince a
preference for the interests of the health care industry over those of
individual litigants. Minors undoubtedly will be impaired by the
strict limitation which eliminates a cause of action for medical mal-
practice two years after the alleged act of malpractice, whether or
not it is discovered within that time.
The difficulties of discovering a latent injury and connecting it
with an act of medical malpractice within two years are compounded
when the victim is a child.47 Indeed, the injuries sustained by minors
often cannot be readily detected until maturity is approached.48 The
paradox of denying a person a remedy before any injury is known to
exist can be abated by a statutory provision allowing for a delayed
discovery of the injury.49
Most states, like Indiana, have altered their statutes of limita-
tions with respect to malpractice actions in an effort to ease the
42. Id.
43. Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-1-67-1(6) (Burns Supp. 1978).
44. Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, __ Ind. __, 413 N.E.2d 891, 895 (1980); Ap-
pellant's Brief at 34, Mansur v. Carpenter, Ind. __, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
45. See supra note 17.
46. The only exception to the strict two-year limitation appears to be when
the physician fraudulently conceals the injury. Guy v. Schult, 236 Ind. 101, 138 N.E.2d
891 (1956). However, at the time of this writing, the fraud exception has not been re-
examined in light of the new statute.
47. Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974) ("It is not difficult
to conceive of situations where the results of medical malpractice upon an infant could
remain undiscovered for a number of years."); see also, Note, Legislative Surgery,
supra note 29, at 341.
48. This is precisely the rationale behind the legal disability statute which
prior to the Malpractice Act, allowed minors a "grace period" after attaining majority
in which to pursue a cause of action. See Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d
867 (1974).
49. The "discovery rule" was rejected in Indiana by Toth v. Lenk, __ Ind.
App. , 330 N.E.2d 336 (1975).
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burdens of physicians and their insurance providers. 0 However, the
statutes of limitations in other jurisdictions are not triggered until a
patient discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the injury." Such statutes protect health care pro-
viders by reducing the time in which most actions can be brought,
but also provide patients victimized by unusually hard-to-detect in-
juries an opportunity to recover damages. Thus, a fair balance is
reached, unlike Indiana's statute of limitations which is overly pro-
tective of physicians' interests at the expense of denying some in-
jured patients a chance to prove their malpractice claims. Even pa-
tients who discover their injuries within the two-year statutory
period may have difficulty obtaining a judicial determination of their
action due to Indiana's requirement that all claims be submitted to a
medical review panel prior to being brought in court.2
Medical Review Panel
In a further attempt to protect the interests of the health care
industry, Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act established a medical
review panel to which all claims must be submitted as a prerequisite
to pursuing a malpractice action in any court.53 The panel is composed
of four members, an attorney chairperson and their health care pro-
viders. 4  However, only the health care providers are voting
members.' When presented with a proposed malpractice complaint,
the panel considers written evidence submitted by all parties and
within six months renders an opinion as to the existence or non-
existence of medical malpractice.' The opinion is not conclusive of
50. See Chapman and White, Are the New State Malpractice Laws Working
to Protect You?, 8 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 40-46 (May 1980). listing the
following states as changing their statutes of limitations for malpractice actions: Ala-
bama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
51. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West
Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. CODE § 25-222 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116 (1980).
52. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2 (Burns Supp. 1982).
53. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to 9-10 (Burns Supp. 1982); failure to submit a
proposed complaint to the medical review panel prior to filing suit results in summary
judgment for the defendant health care provider. Whitaker v. St. Joseph's Hospital,
Ind. App. - , 415 N.E.2d 737 (1981).
54. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-3 (Burns Supp. 1982).
55. Id.
56. "The panel shall render its expert opinioi within one hundred eighty (180)
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liability but is admissible as expert testimony in any subsequent
trial as is the oral testimony of individual panel members. 7 The
medical review panel was attacked on numerous constitutional
grounds but, like the shortened statute of limitations and monetary
limit on recovery, it survied constitutional scrutiny.'
Although, like Indiana, many jurisdictions have upheld manda-
tory review panel requirements, similar prerequisites in other states
have not fared as well.59 In declaring the compulsory arbitration re-
quirements of the Ohio Medical Malpractice Act unconstitutional,
the court in Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center'0 focused on the
plaintiff's added burden of proving malpractice when an unfavorable
decision of the review panel is introduced into evidence."' The Ohio
court pointed to the probability that, in view of the heightened
burden, many parties who lose at the arbitration level will decide
not to proceed to trial.2 The potential for the chilling effect on ac-
cess to courts for bonafide litigants did not disturb the Indiana
Supreme Court which held that the mandatory review panel was
valid as a reasonable. way of furthering the important goals of
malpractice legislation. 3 The result of this judicial balancing of in-
terests takes on special importance when viewed against the
days of the selection of its last member." IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-3.5(a) (Burns Supp.
1982). "The evidence to be considered by the medical review panel shall be promptly
submitted by the respective parties in written form only." IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-4
(Burns Supp. 1982).
57. Any report of the expert opinion reached by the medical review
panel shall be admissible as evidence in any action subsequently brought
by the claimant in a court of law, but such expert opinion shall not be con-
clusive, and either party shall have the right to call, at his cost, any
member of the medical review panel as a witness. If called, the witness
shall be required to appear and testify.
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-9 (Burns Supp. 1982).
58. The specific grounds of constitutional attack were: U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1, equal protection); IND. CONST. art. I, § 12 (open access to courts guarantee);
IND. CONST. art. I, § 20 (right to trial by jury); IND. CONST. art. III, § 1 (separation of
powers doctrine). Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., - Ind. App. -, 404 N.E.2d
585 (1980).
59. See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347
N.E.2d 736 (1976); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio App. 3d 164, 355
N.E.2d 903 (1976); see also Corodemus and Ver Strate, Dark Victory: The Doom of
Medical Malpractice Panels, 5 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 31 (1980).
60. 3 Ohio App. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976).
61. Id. at 908.
62. Id.; see Wilkinson, Victimizing the Victim: A Critical Look at Medical
Malpractice Acts, 18 TRIAL, 40 (June 1982).
63. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., __ Ind. - , 404 N.E.2d 585, 597
(1980).
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backdrop of the panel composition and empirical data indicating that
most plaintiffs submitting proposed complaints to the medical
review panel can expect to receive an unfavorable opinion.
A major criticism of the medical review panel in Indiana is the
tendency for bias inherent in any system of review that calls upon
professionals to judge the conduct of other members of their profes-
sion." In addressing the argument that a panel with a voting
membership composed solely of health care providers would result
in a natural bias toward physicians, the Indiana Supreme Court
responded: "According to Appellants the opinion of the panel will be
biased in favor of the health care providers against whom the com-
plaint is lodged. There is a great deal of speculation here." 5 The ac-
tual results of panel decisions disclose that this speculation is well-
founded."
Since the inception of the medical review panel, 306 opinions
have been rendered." Of these opinions, only fourteen percent have
concluded that malpractice occurred. 8 The thrust of this statistic is
that while all malpractice plaintiffs still have an opportunity to file
64. Cf. Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror
Behavior: A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1079 (1965) (a study demonstrating
that a juror's decision is affected by his occupation); Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D.
218 (D.R.I. 1978).
65. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., __ Ind. .. 404 N.E.2d 585, 593
(1980).
66. Indiana Department of Insurance, PATIENTS COMPENSATION DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE REPORT (1982).
67. Id.
68. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-7 (Burns Supp. 1982) delineates four possible opin-
ions that can be rendered by medical review panels. The review panel can render one
or more of the following opinions:
(a) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or
defendants failed to comply with the appropriate standard of
care as charged in the complaint.
(b) The evidence does not support the conclusion that the defend-
ant or defendants failed to meet the applicable standard of
care as charged in the complaint.
(c) That there is a material issue of fact, not requiring expert opin-
ion, bearing on liability for consideration by the court or jury.
(d) The conduct complained of was or was not a factor of the
resultant damages. If so, whether the plaintiff suffered: (1) any
disability and the extent and duration of the disability, and (2)
any permanent impairment and the percentage of the impair-
ment.
The following chart is a year-to-year breakdown of the opinions rendered. (Ex-
trapolated from DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 66.)
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suit and attempt to try their case in front of a jury, 9 to do so suc-
cessfully the vast majority must negate the written findings of the
expert panel. 0 Additionally, the oral expert testimony of the panel
members will have to be rebutted.7 1 Although the results of
Indiana's medical review panels are not conclusive of a bias, they do
suggest that patients' burdens would be lessened by a change in the
composition of the voting membership of the panel." Consequently,
the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act taken as a whole places
numerous handicaps on patients' rights under the auspices of pro-
moting a burdened health care industry. Furthermore, the Act does
not provide a meaningful remedy for physicians who may still be
victimized by baseless malpractice suits.
The mandatory medical review panel is not a complete bar to
frivolous litigation. 3 A finding of "no malpractice" by the panel
limits a plaintiff's chances for compensation but does not bar him
from pursuing his claim by subsequently filing a malpractice suit.
Although a plaintiff with a meritless claim may ultimately be
Opinions No Material
Year Rendered Malpractice Malpractice Issue of Fact Variations*
1982 58 9 41 3 5
1981 118 16 94 4 4
1980 69 7 55 1 6
1979 40 6 33 1 0
1978 17 3 13 1 0
1977 3 1 2 0 0
1976 1 1 0 0 0
1975 0 0 0 0 0
Total 306 43 238 10 15
*The variation category was used by the Indiana Insurance Department for opinions
"not clearly fitting in the other three categories." Telephone interview with Kay Chap-
man, Office Manager of Patients Compensation Division, Indiana Department of In-
surance (Nov. 10, 1982).
69. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-5 (Burns Supp. 1982) specifically reserves [sub-
ject to prior panel submission] the right to trial by jury;" a patient or his representa-
tive having a claim under this article for bodily injury or death on account of malprac-
tice may file a complaint in any court of law having requisite jurisdiction and demand a
trial by jury."
70. See supra note 57.
71. Id.
72. But see Chapman and White, supra note 50, where the authors state that
before Florida's medical liability mediation act was declared unconstitutional (in
Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980)), physicians were experiencing a 92% win
record at the review panel stage. Florida's review panel was composed of a circuit
judge, an attorney, and a physician.
73. See supra note 69.
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thwarted by the admissibility of the negative panel opinion, the
mere filing of such a suit results in damage to a physician's reputa-
tion and forces the physician to incur legal expenses. Moreover, the
review panel is scheduled to be abolished in 1987"4 leaving physi-
cians without procedural safeguards to dieter spurious suits. In an
attempt to find an effective remedy for damages caused by baseless
malpractice suits, physicians have turned to malicious prosecution
countersuits.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION COUNTERSUITS
The proliferation of medical malpractice litigation and the corre-
sponding increase in frivolous suits have caused physicians to re-
spond by filing countersuits against attorneys who initiate baseless
malpractice actions." Most countersuits proceed on a tort theory of
malicious prosecution."0 Due to the inherent difficulties in proving
the prima facie elements of malicious prosecution, most countersuits
have been remarkably unsuccessful.' This section examines these
74. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-26-3-25 (Burns Supp. 1982).
75. See supra note 18.
76. Nearly all countersuits employ a malicious prosecution theory. See supra
note 20. The only physician countersuit to meet with any success on a different theory
is Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980Y ($85,000 recovery for physician),
which proceeded as an abuse of process action. Additional theories that have been ad-
vanced unsuccessfully are: 1) negligence: Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268
N.W.2d 673 (1978), aff'd in part, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981). Success of
negligence actions as a countersuit depend on showing that the attorney breached a
duty owed to a physician. Attempts have been made to expand the concept of Lucas v.
Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), which established that an attorney
owes a duty to a third-party beneficiary in a will drafting situation. However, courts
have not allowed such an expansion holding that an adverse party is in no way akin to
a third-party beneficiary. But see Note, A Lawyer'& Duty to Reject Groundless Litiga-
tion, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1561 (1980), for an argument advocating the enlargement of
third-party duty; 2) prima facie tort: Drago v. Buonagurio, 89 Misc. 2d 171, 391
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1977), rev'd, 61 App. Div. 2d 282, 404 N.Y.S.2d 250, rev'd, 46 N.Y.S.2d 778,
386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Hirsh and McCaman, Physicians Countersuits,
85 CASE AND COMMENT No. 6, 39 (1980); Reuter, supra note 2 at 213; 3) invasion of
privacy: Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); 4) barratry: Berlin v.
Nathan, 64 11. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 396 N.E.2d 575 (1979);
Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571
S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); 5) infliction of emotional distress: Joseph v. Marko-
vitz, 27 Ariz. App. 122, 551 P.2d 571 (1976); 6) constitutional violations: Berlin v.
Nathan, 64 I1. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); 7) civil rights violation: Rodriguez
v. Carroll, 510 F. Supp. 547 (D.C. Tex. 1981).
77. Although countersuits have enjoyed a reasonable amount of success at
trial court levels, e.g., Fee, Parker & Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) ($75,000 judgment for physicians overturned); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 11. App.
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difficulties and compares Indiana's treatment of such suits with that
of other jurisdictions. To properly develop this analysis, a brief
review of the elements of malicious prosecution and its historical
framework will be helpful.
Malicious prosecution began as a tort remedy for the wrongful
initiation of criminal proceedings."8 Most jurisdictions have extended
the scope of the tort and now recognize it in civil proceedings as
well."9 To be successful in a suit for malicious prosecution of a civil
action, a plaintiff ordinarily must plead and prove five elements:8"
1) the initiation or continuance of a prior judicial proceeding by the
defendant against the plaintiff; 2) termination of the previous suit in
favor of the plaintiff;8 3) the initiation or continuance of the initial
suit without probable cause;" 4) and with malice;83 and 5) finally, ac-
tual damages.' Case law shows that failure to prove the requisite
elements of damages and lack of probable cause are the most signifi-
cant bars to successful malicious prosecution actions."
Damages
American jurisdictions have two distinct and conflicting views
3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978) ($8,000 jury verdict for physicians overturned). See also
Note, Physician Countersuits: Malicious Prosecution, Defamation and A buse of Proc-
ess as Remedies for Meritless Medical Malpractice Suits, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 604 (1976).
For successful physician countersuits, see supra note 19.
78. W. PROSSsR, LAW OF TORTS, § 120 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W.
PROSSER].
79. W. PROSSER, supra note 78, at 851; Birnbaum, supra note 6, at 1022;
Mallen, supra note 1, at 410-11.
80. W. PROSSER, supra note 78, at 835, 855.
81. The requirement of a favorable termination has been abrogated by statute
in Tennessee and Washington, discussed infra notes 156-82 and accompanying text. In
the majority of states requiring a favorable termination, the manner in which the in-
itial action is terminated must tend to indicate the innocence of the accused; thus
dismissal on technical or procedural grounds does not constitute favorable termination
for the purposes of malicious prosecution. Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 114 P.2d 335
(1941), cited in Weaver v. Superior Court, County of Range, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156
Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979). But see Lumpkin v. Friedman, 131 Cal. App. 3d 450, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 378 (1982) (failure to comply with discovery procedures counted as favorable ter-
mination).
82. W. PROSSER, supra note 78, § 119, at 841-47.
83. W. PROSSER, supra note 78, § 119, at 847-50 (Malice is a question of fact to
be decided by the jury and can be inferred from a showing of lack of probable cause).
84. When a malicious prosecution action is based on a prior criminal action,
damages are presumed. W. PROSSER, supra note 78, § 120, at 855. However, damages
must be proven in suits for malicious prosecution of civil action.
85. Reuter, supra note 2, at 220-21.
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on the issue of damages. Indiana, in accord with the majority of
states," follows the more liberal "American Rule" which allows
recovery for any and all injuries incurred by plaintiffs. 7 A sizeable
minority of states, however, adhere stubbornly to the much stricter
"English Rule" which forecloses recovery in a malicious prosecution
action unless the plaintiff can show special injury such as physical
arrest, interference with his property or other damages not or-
dinarily occurring in similar actions." Since arrest or seizure of
property is not likely to result from a baseless suit for professional
86. Twenty-three jurisdictions do not require special damages: Peerson v.
Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917)- Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz.
110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932); Leek v. Brasfield, 226 Ark. 316, 290 S.W.2d 632 (1956); Easton
v. Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084
(1932); Leek v. Brasfield, 226 Ark. 316, 290 S.W.2d 632 (1956);. Easton v. Stockton, 66
Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932); Carlo v.
Bartolotta, 112 Conn. 396, 153 A.- 311 (1930); Tatum Bros. Real Estate & Investment
Co. v. Watson, 92 Fla. 278, 109 So. 623 (1926); Brodie v. Hawaii Auto. Retail Gasoline
Dealers Ass'n, Inc., 631 P.2d 600 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981); McCardle v. McGinley, 86 In&
538 (1882); Carbondale Investment Co. v. Burdick, 67 Kan. 329, 72 P. 781 (1903); Gaf-
fagnini v. Schnaider, 164 La. 1108, 115 So. 287 (1927); White. v. Dingley, 4 Mass. 433
(1808); Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590, 36 N.W. 664 (1888); O'Neill v. Johnson, 53
Minn. 439, 55 N.W. 601 (1893); Harvill v. Tabor, 240 Miss. 750, 128 So.2d 863 (1961);
Brady v. Ervin, 48 Mo. 533 (1871); McCormick v. Willan, 63 Neb. 391, 88 N.W. 558
(1897); Johnson v. Moser, 181 Okla. 75, 72 P.2d 715 (1937); Cisson v. Pickens, 258 S.C.
37, 186 S.E.2d 822 (1972); Teesdale v. Liebschwager, 42 S.D. 323, 174 N.W. 620 (1919);
Libscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 33 S.W. 818 (1896); Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209
(1869); Van Hunter v. Beckley, 129 W. Va. 302, 40 S.E.2d 332 (1946).
87. The absence of the requirement of proving special damages makes a
malicious prosecution action possible, but in no way a likely candidate for success. The
burden of proving the remaining elements is substantial. E.g., Kauffman v. A.H.
Robins Co., 233 Tenn. 515, 448 S.W.2d 400 (1969) ("there is a heavy burden of proof on
the plaintiff in malicious prosecution actions in establishing malice and lack of probable
cause.").
88. The following cases reflect the latest affirmation of the special injury re-
quirement. For a list of cases that established the rule, see O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or.
513, 569 P.2d 561, 564 n.3 (1977). Sixteen jurisdictions presently require special
damages: Rodriguez v. Carroll, 510 F. Supp. 547 (D.C. Tex. 1981) (applying Texas law);
Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980); Taylor v. Greiner, 156 Ga. App. 663, 275
S.E.2d 737 (1980); Taylor v. Greiner, 156 Ga. App. 663, 275 S.E.2d 737 (1980); Berlin v.
Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902
(Iowa 1978); Hook v. Equitable Credit Corp., 402 A.2d 111 (M.D. App. 1979); Farmers
Gin v. Ward, 389 P.2d 9 (N.M. 1964); Gross v. Newburger, 426 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1980);
Koury v. John Meyer of Norwich, 261 S.E.2d 217 (N.C. 1980); Dakters v. Shane, -
Ohio App. -, 412 N.E.2d 399 (1978); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561
(1977); Blumfield v. R.M. Shoemaker, - Pa. Super. -, 429 A.2d 654 (1981); Jacques
v. McLaughlin, 401 A.2d 430 (R.I. 1979); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 226 S.E.2d 108
(1980); Fenner v. Lyndsay, 625 P.2d 180 (Wash. App. 1981); Krieg v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp., 104 Wis. 2d 455, 311 N.W.2d 641 (1981).
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negligence, physicians in "English Rule" jurisdictions have no viable
remedy against wrongful malpractice actions. 9
Commentators and many courts have vigorously criticized the
"English Rule" '9 which began in 1269 in medieval England by the
enactment of the Statute of Marlbridge. 1 Prior to this statute,
malicious prosecution countersuits were allowed in response to civil
as well as criminal actions and no showing of special damages was
necessary.9 2 The Statute of Marlbridge eliminated a private cause of
action for the malicious prosecution of a civil suit in the absence of
special injury. 3 A summary remedy for costs, including attorneys'
fees, was created for successful defendants in the original maliciously
prosecuted action.94 However, since the American jurisdictions that
follow the "English Rule" do not provide for attorney fees or other
court costs to ease the burden of persons wrongfully sued, a great
deal more violence is done to an individual's right to be free from
unfounded suits than was contemplated by the Statute of Marl-
bridge.95 Moreover, even a provision for attorney's fees is no protec-
89. See Reuter, supra note 2, at 255; Note, Countersuit: A Viable Alternative
for the Wrongfully Sued Physician?, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 450, 456 (1980).
90. See W. PROSSER, supra note 78, § 120, at 850-53; Reuter, supra note 2, at
220-34; Note, Malicious Prosecution Liability, supra note 2, at 272. See also Stopka v.
Lesser, 82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 326, 402 N.E.2d 781, 784 (1980) ("We believe a reassessment
of the special damages requirement in this jurisdiction is required."); Dakters v. Shane,
64 Ohio App. 2d 196, 199, 412 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1978) (Mahoney, J., concurring) (In a
decision affirming the special damages rule, "I concur in this judgment and the unfor-
tunate binding application of stare decisis.").
91. Reuter, supra note 2, at 229; Birnbaum, supra note 6, at 1021; for an ex-
haustive inquiry into the history of malicious prosecution, see Note, Groundless Litiga-
tion and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218
(1979).
92. Reuter, supra note 2, at 229.
93. Id.
94. Id. However, an award of costs in prior actions are insufficient to fully
compensate parties injured by maliciously prosecuted actions, as some American
courts have aptly noted: McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 540 (1882) ("[Ilt is too clear
for discussion that the costs which the law gives a successful party are no adequate
compensation for the time, trouble and expense of defending a malicious and
groundless suit."); Lockenour v. Sides, 57 Ind. 360, 364 (1877) ("[W]e cannot, at this
date, shut our eyes to the truth known by everybody, that taxable costs afford a very
partial and inadequate remuneration for the necessary expenses of defending an un-
founded suit; and of course this remedy is not adequate to repair the injury thus
received."); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558, 560 (1897) (in dismissing the no-
tion that costs afford full indemnity to victims of malicious prosecution, the court per
Corliss, C.J. states: "To our minds this argument does not rise to to the dignity of
sophistry.").
95. W. PROSSER, supra note 78, § 120, at 851; Lockenour v. Sides, 57 Ind. 360,
364 (1877).
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tion against the damages caused to reputation and by increases in
liability insurance premiums commonly experienced by physicians
named as malpractice defendants. Although Indiana has long recog-
nized the inequity of requiring special damages," the burden of con-
currently proving the remaining elements serves as a substantial
obstacle to physicians contemplating retaliatory malicious prosecu-
tion actions.
Probable Cause
In jurisdictions that do not require special damages, the most
formidable obstacle facing malicious prosecution plaintiffs is proving
that the initial suit was brought without probable cause.9" The stan-
dard of probable cause to bring suit from a lay litigant's perspective
is well-established in Indiana, and includes a duty to make some in-
vestigation of the facts before initiating litigation.9 However, a
standard for reviewing an attorney's decision to bring suit on behalf
of his client has only recently been developed in Indiana." This stan-
dard contemplates a lesser test of probable cause for attorneys than
is required of lay litigants and renders nugatory the tort of
malicious prosecution in a physician/attorney countersuit setting.100
The first physician/attorney countersuit to reach the appellate
96. Lockenour v. Sides, 57 Ind. 360 (1877).
97. No matter what the standard of probable cause in a particular jurisdic-
tion, the plaintiff will always have the difficult task of proving a negative, ie., want of
probable cause. See Fee, Parker, Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412, 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980).
98. Wong v. Tabor, __ Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1285 (1981). The
standard was first developed in Lacy v. Mitchell, 23 Ind. 67 (1864):
Probable cause may be defined to be what apparent state of facts found
to exist upon reasonable inquiry; that is, such inquiry as the given case
rendered convenient and proper, which would induce a reasonably in-
telligent and prudent man to believe the accused had committed, in a
crimnal case, the crime charged; and in a civil case, that a cause of action
existed.
Subsequent Indiana decisions have employed a similar standard. See Hutchinson v.
Wenzel, 115 Ind. 49, 56 N.E. 845 (1900); Paddock v. Watts, 116 Ind. 146, 18 N.E. 518
(1888); Hays v. Blizzard, 30 Ind. 457 (1868); Yerkes v. Washington Manufacturers,_
Ind. App. -, 326 N.E.2d 629 (1975); Strivers v. Old National Bank, 148 Ind. App. 196,
264 N.E.2d 339 (1970); Dwyer v. McLean, 133 Ind. App. 454, 175 N.E.2d 50 (1962). But
see Staz v. Koplow, - Ind. App. - , 397 N.E.2d 1082 (1979) (employing a standard
not expressly mentioning investigation).
99. Wong v. Tabor, - Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1285 (1981).
100. See Rawson, Wong v. Tabor: The Latest Word in Physician-Attorney
Countersuits, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. - (1982) [hereinafter Rawson).
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court level in Indiana was Wong v. Tabor."' The malpractice action
giving rise to the countersuit in Wong v. Tabor was brought by At-
torney Glenn J. Tabor on behalf of his client, Mrs. "P", against Dr.
Samuel N.T. Wong."' Mrs. "P" underwent a neurosurgical procedure
known as a cervical anterior fusion"'o in an apparent effort to stop
her persistent headaches."4 As a result of this surgery, Mrs. "P"
was left a quadriplegic." 5 Six months prior to the operation Dr.
Wong had rendered gynecological services to Mrs. "P" and had
previously functioned as her family physician."' However, Dr. Wong
did not recommend neurosurgery nor did he refer her to the physi-
cian who performed the operation."7 Dr. Wong rendered no pre-
operative care, nor did he assist in the operation."' Dr. Wong's only
involvement with Mrs. "P" occurred over a month after her opera-
tion when he prescribed a mineral oil and soap-suds enema to
relieve her constipation."'
Dr. Wong was sued for medical malpractice even though he was
not involved in the surgery that resulted in Mrs. "P's" quad-
riplegia."' Moreover, Dr. Wong was retained as a defendant for over
eighteen months before he finally obtained summary judgment."'
The only mention of his name on the medical records was his
medication order for Mrs. "P's" constipation."' As a result of this
baseless malpractice suit, which received local publicity, Dr. Wong's
malpractice insurance premiums increased by thirty percent."' He
received fewer referrals and his income decreased in the year
following the suit."' Consequently, Dr. Wong instituted a malicious
101. __ Ind. App. - , 422 N.E.2d 1279 (1981).
102. Id. at 1281.
103. Rawson, supra note 100, at -.
104. White, A Court Widens the Malpractice Net, MED. EcON. 70 (June 7, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as White].
105. Rawson, supra note 100, at -.
106. Id.; White, supra note 104, at 70.
107. Rawson, supra note 100, at __. But see Wong v. Tabor, - Ind. App.
-, 422 N.E.2d 1274, 1281 (1981) (indicating that Tabor contends that Wong did refer
Mrs. P. to the neurosurgeon).
108. Rawson, supra note 100, at __.
109. Id.; Wong v. Tabor, ___ Ind. App. , 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (1981).
110. White, supra-note 104, at 70 (a total of nine physicians were sued, two of
whom never met Mrs. "P"' until after her surger*.
111. Despite requests for voluntary dismissal by Dr. Wong's attorney. Rawson,
supra note 100, at _.
112. Rawson, supra note 100, at __; White, supra note 104, at 70.
113. Rawson, supra note 100, at -; White, supra note 104, at 73.
114. Rawson, supra note 100, at ; White, supra note 104, at 73.
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prosecution suit against attorney Tabor."5
The jury in the malicious prosecution action returned a $25,000
verdict for Dr. Wong.' However, the trial judge set aside the jury
verdict and entered judgment for attorney Tabor."7 Dr. Wong ap-
pealed the trial court's decision. In denying relief,"8 the Indiana ap-
pellate court established a probable cause standard that encom-
passes an attorney's decison to bring any suit."9 The standard is as
follows:
[W]hether the claim merits litigation against the defendant
in question on the basis of the facts known to the attorney
when the suit is commenced. The question is answered by
determining that no competent and reasonable attorney
familiar with the law of the forum would consider that the
claim was worthy of litigation on the basis of the facts
known by the attorney who instituted the suit.12
This newly developed standard fails to require attorneys to conduct
any investigation prior to filing suit. 2 '
By allowing malpractice claims to be filed absent any investiga-
tion into the facts, the Wong decision effectively eliminates the
possibility of recovery by a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution ac-
tion. '2 Further, it encourages purposeful ignorance on the part of at-
115. Originally, the malicious prosecution suit named as defendants Mrs. "P",
her husband, and attorney Tabor's entire law firm. However, after determining that
Tabor had sole responsibility for naming and retaining defendants in the malpractice
action, all other defendants were dismissed. White, supra note 104, at 73.
116. Wong v. Tabor, __ Ind. App. -, 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1281 (1981).
117. Id.
118. The trial court set the jury verdict aside on grounds of failure to prove
favorable termination of the prior suit. The Appellate Court concluded that setting
aside the verdict on favorable termination grounds was error, but nevertheless affirmed
on grounds of failure to prove lack of probable cause. The probable cause issue was
urged by Tabor's attorney as an alternative rationale to sustain the trial court's
holding. Wong v. Tabor, - Ind. App. __, 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (1981).
119. Wong, 422 N.E.2d at 1287.
120. Id. at 1288.
121. It is important to note that the Wong standard encompasses an attorney's
decision to bring any suit, not just medical malpractice actions. However, the problems
with the no investigation standard are exacerbated in a medical malpractice setting
because of the serious injuries that necessarily follow being named a malpractice
defendant, albeit subsequent exoneration. For example, the policy of Dr. Wong's in-
surance company, The Medical Protective Co., was to raise malpractice premiums 30
percent any time a lawsuit was filed against a physician. Record at 277, Wong.
122. See White, supra note 104 ("The appeals court's negative ruling means
that doctors' malicious prosecution suits can probably never be won." Quoting attorney
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torneys. In a case of questionable validity, the attorney can simply
listen to the facts given him by his client and file suit without fur-
ther investigation. Undertaking an investigation would risk the
discovery of facts sublating the validity of his claim. As long as a
reasonable attorney would be satisfied that the claim appeared to be
worthy of litigation given as true the client's version of the facts,
and these are the only facts known to the attorney at the time of in-
stituting the suit, the attorney cannot be liable for malicious prose-
cution in the State of Indiana. A higher standard of probable cause
has been required by lay litigants.
Private individuals generally have been required to make a
reasonable investigation into the facts before pursuing either civil
or criminal suits." Failure to make any investigation would result
in the want of probable cause and provide an injured defendant
relief in a subsequent malicious prosecution action. 24 It is difficult to
see why the Wong court enunciated a lesser standard of probable
cause for attorneys. 2' This watered-down standard is particularly
untenable in the context of a medical malpractice suit. Malpractice
actions often involve complex medical circumstances. Thus, it is
quite possible that "facts" known by clients will be incorrect. Fur-
ther, any action that reflects negatively on the professional com-
petence of a physician is likely to cause reputational harm and finan-
cial damage and should not be indiscriminately brought.1" The
question of whether or not to require an attorney to investigate a
Rawson). See also Wills, Assault with a Deadly Lawsuit: A Wrong in Search of a
Remedy, 51 L.A. BAR J. 499, 501 (1976) ("[Ilt would be a feeble and unimaginative at-
torney indeed who could not show some basis for believing initially that his client had
an arguable claim."). Incomplete or inadequate investigation is a major cause of
baseless suits. Note, A Lawyer's Duty to Reject Groundless Litigation, 26 WAYNE L.
REV. 1561 n.9 (1980) and cases cited therein. Consequently, the Wong standard does
not discourage baseless lawsuits. See Rawson, supra note 100, at __.
123. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
124. Id. See also Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Stock, - Ind. App. -, 392
N.E.2d 505 (1979) (stressing the necessity of inquiry as an element of probable cause
and affirming a $75,000 recovery for a malicious prosecution plaintiff because of a
failure to make adequate inquiry into the facts, hence, a lack of probable cause), reh'g
denied, __ Ind. __, 403 N.E.2d 1077 (1980).
125. Unless one takes the cynical attitude that judges, being members of the
legal profession, have a natural inclination to favor attorneys. This is clearly the at-
titude of Dr. Wong. See White, supra note 104, at 75 ("I think the lawyers and judges
are in cahoots.").
126. See supra note 122; see also Birnbaum, supra note 6, at 101; Daughtry,
The View of the Medical Profession, 38 INS. COUNS. J. 534 (1971) (Dr. Daughtry ex-
plains in unmistakably emotive language the visceral impact of a malpractice suit on
physicians and their families).
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suit before bringing it in court has generated a substantial amount
of judicial response.
Some courts, like Wong, have been unwilling to recognize a duty
for attorneys to further investigate the facts given to them by their
clients."2 There are two major reasons for this reluctance. First,
"English Rule" jurisdictions rarely reach the issue of probable cause
because the failure to allege special damages provides a ready
ground to dismiss a malicious prosecution action."2 Second, a duty to
investigate would connote a duty of ordinary care to an adverse
third party, which when breached, would give rise to a common law
negligence action against the attorney."0 No court has yet extended
the scope of duty to this degree.'
Several "American Rule" jurisdictions have established a duty
requiring attorneys to conduct a reasonable investigation. 32 The
standards are worded in a sufficiently restrictive manner to avoid
the problems inherent in expanding the concept of third-party negli-
gence."s The Kentucky Supreme Court recently awarded two physi-
127. See e.g., Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d
675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975); Fee, Parker & Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379 So.2d 412 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978), aff'd in
part, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981).
128. See e.g., Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. App. 1978); Spencer
v. Burglass, 337 So.2d 596 (L.A. App. 1976); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429,
268 N.W.2d 673 (1978), aff'd in part, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981); Petrou v. Hale,
43 N.C. App. 655, 260 S.E.2d 130 (1979); Moll v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978).
129. The following cases dismiss malicious prosecution actions for failure to
allege special damages and never address whether or not investigation is a necessary
element of probable cause: Bickle v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Iowa), aff'd, 590
F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978);
Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Ackerman v. Lagono, 172 N.J. Super. 468,
412 A.2d 1054 (1979); Dakters v. Shane, __ Ohio App. , 412 N.E.2d 399 (1978);
O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080,
266 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
130. Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978), aff'd in
part, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585, 593 n.12 and cases cited therein.
131. But see Note, A Lawyer's Duty to Reject Groundless Litigation, 26
WAYNE L. REV. 1561 (1980); Schunk v. Zeff & Zeff P.C., 109 Mich. App. 163, 311
N.W.2d 322 (1981) (MacKenzie, J., dissenting: "[I1t is clear that a duty of reasonable in-
vestigation in favor of a potential adversary would not conflict with or restrict a
lawyer's duty and obligations to his client, but rather would be complementary to it.").
132. Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120
Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975); Fee, Parker & Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379 So.2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981).
133. For a discussion of these problems, see Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1,
312 N.W.2d 585 (1981).
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cians a total of $37,500 in a malicious prosecution action.'" The court
exacted two duties from attorneys. First, to exercise the degree of
care which an ordinarily careful, skillful, and prudent attorney
would exercise under similar circumstances.'35 Second, not to in-
stitute a legal proceeding without probable cause. 3 "
The court distinguished an earlier Kentucky case that refused
to recognize a duty of investigation owed to an adverse party in a
countersuit proceeding solely on a negligence theory.'3 7 In a negli-
gence action, no duty of investigation is owed to an adverse party
prior to filing a malpractice action." However, in a malicious prose-
cution countersuit, a failure to investigate the facts prior to bringing
a malpractice action on a client's behalf is material to the duty to
refrain from initiating suit without probable cause.'39 Thus, Kentucky
has found a formula that will reduce the frequency of spurious
claims by requiring prior investigation but will not seriously impair
patients' ability to bring valid suits.' Florida has similarly sought
to reduce the incidence of baseless claims by establishing a duty of
investigation for attorneys."'
An appellate court in Florida recently established a probable
cause standard for attorneys to bring suit on behalf of their clients.'
In balancing the freedom of access to courts against the need to be
free from unfounded suits, the Florida court focused on attorneys'
duty to zealously represent their clients within the bounds of law
and professional ethics.1 3 This duty, owed solely to a client, was held
to include a reasonable investigation into the surrounding facts
before initiating suit on the client's behalf.'" Florida's standard
134. Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981).
135. Id. at 902.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 901.
139. Id. at 902 (quoting Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978)).
140. Raine v. Drasin is an important victory for physicians because the court
also allowed the testimony of a member of the Ethics Committee of the Louisville Bar
Association as an expert to determine whether or not the defendants had conducted
themselves as ordinary and prudent attorneys. The expert's testimony was that the
defendant's actions did not comply with the expected standard and this was used by
the court to show the lack of probable cause. See supra note 139, at 901.
141. Fee, Parker & Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
142. Id. at 414.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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serves to hinder baseless claims while addressing only the duty of
care owed by an attorney to a client.145 Although the Florida stand-
ard and that of Wong are diametrically different, both relied on the
same California case, Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henig-
son.
146
The California appellate court decision in Tool Research pro-
vides one of the most often quoted judicial standards used to deter-
mine whether an attorney had probable cause to bring suit.147 The
Tool Research court recognized the need for attorneys to in-
vestigate their case before filing suit in holding that "An attorney
has probable cause to represent a client ... when, after a reasonable
investigation48 and industrious search of legal authority he has an
honest belief that his client's claim is tenable in the forum in which
it is to be tried.""' The probable cause test of the California court is
two-fold. First, the attorney must subjectively believe that the claim
has merit.' Second, the belief must satisfy an objective standard. 5'
The Wong court adopted a similar two-prong approach. 2 How-
ever, in Tool Research the court expressly required attorneys to in-
vestigate facts before filing suit on their clients' behalf. Conversely,
any contemplation of investigation prior to bringing suit is absent
from the Wong standard. Thus, the Wong standard does not ac-
curately reflect the need to protect individuals from unfounded
lawsuits evinced in the case it relies on most heavily.
Though Indiana follows the more liberal "American Rule" regard-
ing damages, under Wong a successful malicious prosecution action
145. Id.
146. 46 Cal. App. 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975). The court in Fee, Parker &
Lloyd, 379 So.2d at 417, cites from Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr.
237, 242 (1975). Actually, the language relied on by the Florida court is Norton v.
Hines, quoting Tool Research & Engineering Corp.; Wong v. Tabor, __ Ind. App.
-' 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1287-88 (1981).
147. Wong, - Ind. App. at __, 422 N.E.2d, at 1287. Although the Wong
court cited no cases relying upon Tool Research, independent research indicates Tool
Research has been relied upon in a number of cases. See, e.g., Cowles v. Carter, 115
Cal. App. 3d 350, 171 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1981); Weaver v. Superior Court of Orange County,
94 Cal. App. 3d 498, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979); Field v. Goldstein, 379 So. 2d 410 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
148. (Emphasis added).
149. Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 917, 120
Cal. Rptr. 291, 297 (1975).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Wong v. Tabor, __ Ind. App. - , 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1288 (1981).
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against an attorney is very unlikely. In Wong, the failure to include
a reasonable investigation as part of an attorney's standard of prob-
able cause is inconsistent with Indiana precedent requiring such in-
vestigation for private litigants and leaves unshielded notions of in-
dividual protection from damaging, baseless lawsuits that are pro-
tected in other jurisdictions. The Wong standard tips the balance in
favor of patients and their attorneys.
Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act may have been an unmen-
tioned factor bearing on the court's decision in Wong."' As noted
previously, the Act currently provides a number of procedural safe-
guards designed to protect physicians."4 Yet, for all the benefits
health care providers may enjoy through malpractice legislation, the
Wong standard serves as a constant reminder that a physician can
still fall prey to a debilitating baseless suit and have no meaningful
recourse.'55 Moreover, the Wong standard encompasses an attorney's
decision to bring any suit. Other professionals, such as accountants
or attorneys, do not benefit from legislatively imposed safeguards.
Hence, they are subjected to unchecked malpractice suits and
denied any effective relief.
Another problem with Indiana's present treatment of malicious
prosecution countersuits is the need to bring the suit, if at all, as an
entirely separate action after the termination of the preliminary
suit. The enactment of a statute permitting a malicious prosecution
counterclaim would serve to discourage baseless claims without
seriously hampering the pursuit of valid ones; and thus would be a
positive step toward reaching a fair balance of interests between
physicians and patients. While the success of malicious prosecution
counterclaims would be contingent on the newly articulated stand-
ard in Wong,' the utility of allowing parties to resolve all issues in
a single proceeding requires examination.
COUNTERCLAIMING FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
A counterclaim for malicious prosecution would abrogate the
153. Since the alleged malpractice occurred in 1974, prior to the inception of
the Act, no procedural safeguards were in existence.
154. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Further, Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 822 (1976), held that the right of access to courts for prisoners must be
adequate, effective and meaningful. Surely, physicians and other professionals should
be afforded the same considerations.
156. A counterclaim provision would not effect the requisite common law
elements of lack of probable cause, malice or damages.
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long-standing common law rule that favorable termination of a prior
action is a necessary element of a malicious prosecution charge.'57
However, burgeoning numbers of lawsuits, many frivolous, and
swollen court dockets are problems unique to modern times and de-
mand a reassessment of the termination rule. 5 The use of malicious
prosecution counterclaims, which are presently unavailable in Indi-
ana,159 would further the interests of convenience to litigants and
judicial economy... while reducing the incidence of baseless claims.
Any potential for abuse that might exist in the use of a counterclaim
can be checked by enforcing the remaining elements of the tort and
using procedural devices within the discretion of the court.
Despite the logical appeal of allowing all claims between parties
to be decided in the same proceeding, most courts have summarily
dismissed malicious prosecution counterclaims.' Abundant case law
insists on a favorable" 2 termination of a prior action as a prerequi-
site to a claim of malicious prosecution. 6 ' Opponents of malicious
157. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
158. Tort law is dynamic, not static, and the unprecedented increase in
malpractice suits resulting in the physician countersuit phenomenon dictates a review
of traditional notions of malicious prosecution. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 1-16
(4th ed. 1971); see also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) ("Indeed, the great office of
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it
to the changes of time and circumstances.").
159. Aluminum Co. of America v. City of Lafayette, Indiana, __ Ind. App.
__, 412 N.E.2d 312 (1980).
160. See, Note, Groundless Litigation and Malicious Prosecution Debate: A
Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218, 1236 (1979). Cf. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715 (1966) (allowing actions based on state law to be heard along with federal
claims in federal court as long as they arose from a common nucleus of fact and hear-
ing all claims together would further notions of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants).
161. Babb v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92
Cal. Rptr. 179, 181 (1971) expressed a common judicial sentiment by saying, "It is horn-
book law that the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must plead and prove that
the prior judicial proceedings of which he complains terminated in his favor." See infra
notes 162-63.
162. To be "favorable," the prior suit must have terminated in a manner tending
to show the innocence of the accused. See supra note 81.
163. See 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 554 (1948) ("As a general rule, a ter-
mination of the proceedings on which an action for malicious prosecution is based in
favor of the defendant in such proceedings is an essential element of the cause of ac-
tion.") and cases cited therein. See also Babb v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 3
Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971) and cases cited therein. But see Son-
nichsen v. Streeter, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 659, 239 A.2d 63 (1967) (allowing malicious prose-
cution counterclaim: "There appears to be no practical need for further litigation, and
justice will best be served if the residuum of issues be terminated in the present
suit."); Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 83 A.2d 246 (1951)
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prosecution counterclaims argue that the action would result in in-
consistent judgments, encourage the use of an action disfavored by
the law and deteriorate attorney/client relationships. 1 4 These
arguments are ill-founded.
Inconsistent judgments can easily be avoided by careful jury in-
structions"5 and narrowly drafted counterclaim statutes.66 There is
at least facial merit to the concern that the number of malicious
prosecution actions will increase. Counterclaims are easier and less
expensive to initiate than separate actions and can be expected to
be used with more frequency. However, it does not conclusively
follow that counterclaims will be any more successful than counter-
suits. 6 7 Difficult obstacles of probable cause and damages still re-
main to be overcome regardless of the procedural posture of a
malicious prosecution claim.
Another common fear is the danger that an attorney's relation-
ship with his client may be impaired by forcing the attorney to de-
fend his actions while simultaneously presenting his client's case.'
("[D]efendant's counterclaim should not be subjected to summary disposition . . . only
to have the action immediately reinstituted as an independent suit."); Herendeen v.
Ley Realty, 75 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1947)
(where a counterclaim is interposed, the entire subjects of whether or not
there has been malicious prosecution and what damage, if any, resulted
therefrom, may all be tried out and determined efficiently and effectively
with a minimum of effort and expense; or, if the circumstances warrant,
separate trials and different modes of trial of different issues may be
ordered);
Eiteljorg v. Bogner, 502 P.2d 970 (Colo. App. 1972) (allowing defendant to present
evidence on malicious prosecution counterclaim after court found for defendant at close
of plaintiffs case).
164. Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685, 688 (1978) ("The con-
siderations underlying the requirement that a complaint for malicious prosecution
plead the favorable outcome of the prior cause, are, in effect, broader than the rule
itself."). See also Birnbaum, supra note 6, at 1080.
165. Courts have resorted to interrogatory and other forms of special verdicts
in situations that involve complicated and potentially confusing issues. See e.g., Li v.
Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
166. A statute that defers evidence on a counterclaim until decision on the
primary suit would totally eliminate any possibility of inconsistent judgments. See in-
fra text at 34.
167. Counterclaimants will still be faced with the burdens of proving that the
primary suit was brought without probable cause. Essentially, this same proof is used
regularly to defeat malpractice actions. However, in malicious prosecution counter-
claims, the standard of proof will be higher. See Note, Groundless Litigation and the
Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J., 1218, 1235 (1979).
168. Since counterclaims generally proceed only against the opposing party, ab-
sent a special statutory provision allowing a counterclaim against the attorney as well,
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This problem can be largely obviated by attorneys researching their
cases before filing suit, in which case a malicious prosecution
counterclaim would be unsuccessful. If the counterclaim was suffi-
ciently unfounded, it may give rise to a separate malicious prosecu-
tion action by the attorney.'69 At least two states have agreed that
the arguments of counterclaim opponents are outweighed by the
need to provide procedural advantages to wrongfully sued in-
dividuals."7 °
In legislative actions apparently prompted by the American
Medical Association's Model Counterclaim Act, 7' both Washington
and Tennessee have passed statutes abrogating the common law ele-
ment of favorable termination and providing specifically for
malicious prosecution counterclaims.' Proponents of the counter-
the attorney will have to be joined as parties pursuant to Ind. Trial R. 19, 20(A)(2).
Since many clients will have a complete defense in advice of counsel, in practice at-
torneys may be the usual target for a counterclaim. Advice of counsel is a complete
defense for defendants in a malicious prosecution charge. The defense relates to prob-
able cause in that if a person, before instituting a prosecution, consults with an at-
torney, discloses all known facts, and acts upon the attorney's advice, he has probable
cause. Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Mason, 148 Ind. 578, 46 N.E. 332 (1897). But unless
the person seeking advice does so in good faith and acts on it for an honest, not im-
proper purpose, the defense does not lie. Harper v. Goodin, - Ind. App. -, 409
N.E.2d 1129 (1980). See also Dwyer v. McLean, 133 Ind. App. 454, 175 N.E.2d 50 (1961)
("[The fact that appellant apparently sought the advice of counsel before the institu-
tion of the prosecution [is not] conclusive evidence that he acted without malice or that
probable cause existed.").
169. Suits for the malicious prosecution of a malicious prosecution action are
very rare. See Hopke v. O'Byrne, 148 So.2d 755, 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ("Our
research has not uncovered any case in this or another jurisdiction involving, as here,
an action for maliciously prosecuting another malicious prosecution action.").
170. Tennessee and Washington. See infra note 172.
171. See Birnbaum, supra note 6, at 1080, setting forth the A.M.A. model
counterclaim act:
In any action for damages for personal injury or death, whether
based on tort or contract law or otherwise, a counterclaim for damages
for abuse of process in filing such action may be filed and litigated in the
same action provided that the counterclaim is based upon substantial
allegations of material facts.
Professor Birnbaum points out that the term "abuse of process" probably refers to
"malicious prosecution" because counterclaims for abuse of process have traditionally
been available.
172. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4-24-50 provides:
In any action for damages, whether based on tort or contract or
otherwise, a claim or counterclaim for damages may be litigated in the
principal action for malicious prosecution on the ground that the action
was instituted with knowledge that the same was false, and unfounded,
malicious and without probable cause in the filing of such action, or that
the same was filed as a part of a conspiracy to misuse judicial process by
filing an action known to be false and unfounded.
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claims assert that the use of such a procedural device will deter
frivolous suits and provide victims of groundless litigation an im-
mediate, complete legal remedy for the harm they have suffered
while conserving judicial time and energy by allowing both malprac-
tice and malicious prosecution claims to be decided by the same
tribunal. 173 Passage of the Washington statute was hailed as a major
victory for physicians in the fight against frivolous malpractice
claims.174 However, any victory was short-lived as Washington courts
have refused to interpret the new statute as eliminating the com-
mon law requirement of special damages.'75 An appellate court
reasoned that statutes in derogation of the common law were to be
strictly construed, and had the legislature intended to eliminate the
special injury requirement it would have expressly done so.'76 Since
For a review of Washington's statute, see Note, Counterclaiming for Malicious Prose-
cution and Abuse of Process: Washington's Response to Unmeritorious Civil Suits, 14
WILLAMETTE L.J. 401 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Counterclaiming for Malicious Prose-
cution]. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116(4)(b) provides:
In any action for damages for personal injury or death, whether based on
tort or contract law, or otherwise, a counterclaim for damages for
malicious prosecution (on the ground that the principle action was in-
stituted with improper intent and without probable cause) or malicious
abuse of process (on the ground that there was an improper use with im-
proper intent of the process) in filing such action may be filed and liti-
gated in the same action; provided, however, that the counterclaim shall
be based upon substantial allegations.
173. Birnbaum, supra note 6, at 1080.
174. J. Rawson, Current Issues in Professional Liability Litigation (June 20,
1979) (unpublished speech given to Protective Medical Association of Lake County, In-
diana).
175. Gem. Trading Co. v. Cudahy, 22 Wash. App. 279, 588 P.2d 1222 (1978),
affd, 92 Wash. 2d 956, 603 P.2d 828 (1979). In affirming the appellate decision, tl03
Supreme Court of Washington specifically declined to rule on whether or not the new
counterclaim statute abrogated the need to show special injury and arrest. Noting that
if the statute was substantive, it would not apply retroactively, and thus was not per-
tinent to the case before the court which began prior to the enactment of the statute.
Alternatively, if the statute was procedural and applicable retroactively, it could not
abrogate a common law element not explicitly eliminated. However, all Washington ap-
pellate courts have agreed that the requirements of special injury and arrest remain
intact. Batten v. Abrams, 28 Wash. App. 736, 626 P.2d 984 (1981); Fenner v. Lindsay,
28 Wash. App. 626, 625 P.2d 180 (1981); Gem Trading Company, 22 Wash. App. 279,
588 P.2d 1222 (1978).
176. Gem Trading Co., Inc. v. Cudahy, 22 Wash. App. 278, 588 P.2d 1222, 1236
(1978). But since the Washington counterclaims statute addresses every common law
element except damages, see supra note 172, it is equally reasonable to assume that
the malicious prosecution standard contemplated by the legislature was exactly that
which was reflected in the statute. Cf. Northwest Airline, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union, __ U.S. __ , 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1584 (1981) ("The presumption that a remedy
was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a
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the special injury requirement has yet to be satisfied in any physi-
cian countersuit,' the ability to counterclaim for malicious prosecu-
tion is of little benefit to physicians faced with the burden of prov-
ing special damages.
The adoption of a counterclaim statute in Indiana, however,
could be an effective method of balancing the interests of physicians
and malpractice plaintiffs. Since Indiana follows the more liberal
"American Rule" and, thus, does not require special damages, the
elimination of the termination requirement would not be a totally il-
lusory gain for physicians."8 Furthermore, if the arguments in favor
of malicious prosecution counterclaims do not totally persuade In-
diana courts and the legislature that the benefits of allowing
counterclaims outweigh the burdens, a compromise position can be
reached. A statute could be drafted to allow malicious prosecution
counterclaims in the pleading stage of trials but defer the presenta-
tion of evidence in their support until after a decision on the merits
of the primary suit is reached. This method will essentially preserve
the common law rule of prior favorable termination. If the plaintiff
is successful in the primary action, the counterclaim will be dismissed
automatically. In the presence of unusual circumstances vitiating the
usefulness of a counterclaim, a court would retain the power to
order that the malicious prosecution issue be tried separately pur-
suant to Indiana Trial Rule 42(B).' 79 Hence, a malicious prosecution
could be used effectively to deter frivolous suits 8 ° with minimum
prejudice to good faith litigants.
comprehensive legislative scheme."). But cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)
(saying if Congress had intended judicial immunity to be abrogated, it would have
specifically so provided).
177. Both appellate level victories by physicians in countersuits using the
malicious prosecution theory have been in "American Rule" jurisdictions. See supra
note 19.
178. But given the Wong standard of probable cause, counterclaims would not
be very effective. However, it is easier to revise an appellate court's interpretation of
probable cause than it is to abrogate a common law element of a tort.
179. Ind. Trial R. 42(B) (Burns Supp. 1973):
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim,
or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate
the right of trial by jury.
180. While it is possible that malicious prosecution counterclaims will be no
more successful than countersuits, it is more likely that the presence of a counterclaim
threat will induce attorneys and clients to be more careful about filing baseless claims.
See also Note, Counterclaiming for Malicious Prosecution, supra note 172, at 412-13.
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The present system requiring that malicious prosecution actions
be brought separately is unfair to physicians and other faultless vic-
tims of wrongful litigation. The necessity of waiting for a prior ter-
mination of one suit and then instituting an entirely new one results
in physicians spending years in litigation and thousands of dollars in
court costs and attorney fees."' Even if a physician is successful in a
separate, subsequent malicious prosecution action, the fees incurred
in the second suit will offset his recovery and thus deny him a full
and complete remedy.18  Malicious prosecution counterclaims,
especially in American Rule jurisdictions like Indiana, can be used
effectively and are necessary to provide litigants with an opportunity
to settle all issues in one judicial proceeding. The establishment of
such counterclaims, coupled with a revision of the probable cause
standard to include a duty of reasonable investigation, would effec-
tively deter attorneys from bringing baseless suits without
discouraging bona fide litigants from initiating valid malpractice ac-
tions.
CONCLUSION
The task of striking a fair balance between the rights of physi-
cians and patients is not an easy one. Numerous and conflicting in-
terests abound,183 the dominant one being ensuring the existence of
adequate health care services."M Legislative and judicial efforts to
fairly reconcile the competing interests have resulted in a mal-
practice act that favors physicians and a malicious prosecution stand-
ard that denies a person a meaningful opportunity to recover
damages for injuries sustained in a wrongfully initiated suit. Indiana
has taken an important first step by recognizing the problems caused
by the the rise in malpractice litigation and attempting to curb the
181. Wills, Assault with a Deadley Lawsuit: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy,
51 L.A. BAR J. 499 (1975) (successful defense of malpractice claim cost physician
$17,500; he was advised not to initiate separate malicious prosecution action although
claim was unfounded); White, A Court Widens the Malpractice Net, MEDICAL
ECONOMICS, 70, 75 (June 7, 1982) (the malicious prosecution action in Wong v. Tabor
cost Dr. Wong $6,000). See also Note, Counterclaiming for Malicious Prosecution,
supra note 172, at 413.
182. Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A
Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218, 1236 (1979).
183. The competing interests stated in their simplest form are the right of
open access to courts for litigants versus the right to be free from vexatious litigation
for the physicians.
184. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., - Ind. __, 404 N.E.2d 585, 595
(1980).
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crisis before irrevocable damage occurred.'85 However, the first step
cannot be the last. Thus, a reassessment of the situation and its cor-
responding solutions is needed.
The Medical Malpractice Act serves as a strong deterrent to
most baseless claims, 8 but may also indirectly discourage good faith
litigants from bringing valid claims. Additionally, despite the Act's
inclusiveness, physicians who still may be victimized by a wrongful
malpractice suit are without a viable remedy. The failure to require
any investigation by an attorney prior to instigating legal action en-
courages the filing of baseless suits against innocent health care pro-
viders and other professionals. For the tort of malicious prosecution
to have any prophylactic functions as a bar to spurious suits, it must
include a duty for attorneys to conduct a reasonable investigation in-
to the facts in issue as an element of probable cause.
Finally, the wisdom of requiring that malicious prosecution be
brought, if at all, as an entirely separate action is questionable at
best. A carefully drafted statute providing for malicious prosecution
counterclaims would serve both patients and physicians by allowing
all issues to be decided in one proceeding, thereby reducing the in-
terruption in the personal and professional lives of litigants while
easing the overcrowded court dockets. In 1975, the Indiana
Legislature responded to the medical malpractice crisis with a com-
prehensive Medical Malpractice Act. It is time now to reevaluate
the effectiveness of that Act and seek additional solutions to strike
the balance of interests between health care providers and patients.
Michael James Philippi
185. See supra note 2.
186. See supra note 122.
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